

Urban Warfare at the Beat Level:
A Counterterrorism Model

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The continuing threat of worldwide terrorism is a reality demanding counterterrorism strategic planning and tactical training (Pape, 2005). Homicide-suicide terrorism (HST)¹ is a multivariable phenomenon consisting of a force of combatants with the motivation, necessary skills and determination to attack a designated population causing death and inflicting serious injuries (Schweitzer, 2001) (see fig. 1). The primary goal is to traumatize an entire population and undermine the public sense of security (Ganor, 2001; Hoffman 1998).



fig. 1

Predictably, the attack sites are those places in cities where large numbers of civilians congregate – restaurants, cafés, supermarkets, buses, bus stops, and entertainment venues. When the HST -bomber (HSTB) is able to infiltrate the target area, only law enforcement personnel (LEP) exist as the remaining force able to prevent or mitigate the impact of an attack. It's the cop-on-the-beat, in the inner circle, that now is the last defender in the war against urban terrorism.

An all inclusive ethnographic analysis of terrorism uses culture as an explanatory variable to predict behavior and suggest training methods for combating

¹ To strategically define this form of terrorism it is important to understand the terrorist's modus operandi. The method of assault is designed to cause widespread death (homicide) and injuries to the largest number of civilians regardless of age and gender.

urban warfare at the beat level. Culture is the anthropologist's major theoretical concept for understanding the learned behavior, beliefs, attitudes, values, and ideals characteristic of a particular society (Ember and Ember, 1990). How the culture concept functions is demonstrated by a cross-cultural comparison of Israeli-United States police-civilian behavior.

The Israeli response to why they always "argue" with police is, "we are not



fig. 2 - "Everything is negotiable"
(Focus, The Jerusalem Post)

arguing." What individuals are doing is negotiating, a dominant value in Israeli society. Everything is negotiable (fig. 2) If you don't negotiate you will be seen as giving in, a *frier*, i.e., a "sucker." For the American, however, the rule for interacting with police, first and foremost, is comply (fig. 3). You may politely raise a question, "Have I done anything wrong, officer?" Or, plead guilty with an explanation. You don't negotiate and if you argue it's at your own peril (Johnson, 2003).



fig 3 - "You comply, you don't argue"
(Ozier Muhammad, The New York Times)

Touching is a much more severe and potentially dangerous issue. Proxemics, "man's use of space as an aspect of his culture" (Hall, 1976) is a useful concept for explaining the Israeli and American responses to our examples. Casual conversations in Israel are conducted at 9-10" between individuals and touching is an acceptable nonverbal form of expression (fig. 4). American conversation, on the other hand, generally takes place at a



fig. 4 - Assaulting? Making a point - Israeli Style
(Maariv, September 2003)

distance of 3' (popularly stated, "at arms length").² Closing this distance causes feelings of uncomfortableness and is seen as an intrusion into one's personal and private space and may even be felt as threatening. In a police-civilian encounter the matter of distance and space is taken seriously. A Chicago police pamphlet informs the citizen that touching a police officer or acting in a disorderly manner could result in your arrest



fig. 5

(fig. 5). Give the officer two and half to three feet to do his or her job and do not become argumentative. In a textbook written for LEP the reader is informed that, "...in our culture moving any closer than about 18" to someone invades his personal space." (Remsburg 1986: 436). What you don't do is verbally challenge the

² It has been suggested that the handshake in Western cultures functions to maintain a proper distance between two individuals. Perhaps, a more practical explanation is that the extended open hand can be seen as weapon free. In the Middle East greetings often are with an embrace. Perhaps, a more practical explanation is that the extended open hand can be seen as weapon free.

officer and refuse to immediately follow instructions. Not understanding or adhering to these unwritten cultural rules will be interpreted as "contempt of cop" thereby risking an escalation of the situation usually to the citizen's detriment (Conlon 2004).

The Israeli citizen and police officer share the same culture and therefore they understand that negotiating both verbally and nonverbally is normal. Touching is not felt to be threatening but rather a way of emphasizing the point to be gotten.³ The cultural responses to similar behavior of negotiating and touching evoke quite different interpretations; the Israeli thinks guilt, why isn't he or she negotiating? Suspicion, what is being hidden, not being said? And, standing far apart – what is being concealed from me? What don't they want me to see?

Israeli police interaction with civilians, e.g., typically draws a crowd that enters the ongoing negotiations, verbally and physically at close proximity to one another (Rosenthal, 2003). Assaults, stabbings, and shootings consequently are made easier within this cultural context.⁴ The comparison of dissimilar Israeli-U.S. reactions to police-civilian contacts illustrates how culture affects behavior.

I. The Culture Concept

The importance of the culture concept therefore is directly applicable in training for counterterrorism. The following examples are taken from the Israeli, Middle Eastern, American experiences.

³ Middle East inhabitants have been termed "contact people" versus Western culture "non-contact" people (Montague, 1971).

⁴ "Car thief stabs two cops. ..." (Jerusalem Post, Oct. 24, 2005). "... Border policeman ... when the suspect ... pulled a knife from his shoe and charged him and stabbed him." (Jerusalem Post, Feb. 7, 2003).

Gender: Culturally understood

Gender specific interaction between men and women in the Middle East demands a strict adherence to separation, distance, and the hands off code of conduct. Rigorous observance of this cultural rule of behavior produces stratagems used by terrorists to deceive. Male terrorists, disguised as women, are hard to identify because Arab female garb covers the entire body (burka, see fig. 6-7) making apprehension difficult. Additionally, when suspicions are aroused, a female officer is required to frisk and search a person thought to be a woman. Other incidents can be cited of culture specific treatment afforded women perceived to be pregnant, feigning illness or claiming a sick infant's need for transportation to a hospital by taxi or ambulance.



fig. 6

Because it is known that little attention is paid to adolescent Israeli girls; terrorist organizations have recruited young girls, dressed like teen-agers or university students, with a modern hair style, contemporary makeup, sunglasses and tight



fig. 7

fitting jeans, who then can pass for an Israeli and infiltrate Jewish crowded areas without arousing suspicion.

Humiliation: a core value

Throughout Middle Eastern culture humiliation is understood to be a major insult to an individual's self-esteem, dignity and honor. To be humiliated is to be humbled, an emotional state beyond embarrassment causing outrage and hatred.

The experience of being 'cuffed in Israel always elicits a strong feeling of humiliation. Here by comparison with American culture one finds a set of significantly different core values and their manifestation in police behavior. Historically,

humiliation as a form of public punishment and scorn can be traced to the public use of the pillory in the village square during colonial times in America (fig. 8). Today, causing humiliation is used as an



fig. 8

intentional procedure when police execute an arrest warrant by 'cuffing the perpetrator ("perp") during peak times of a business day thus ensuring that a large number of coworkers will be present to witness the "perp walk." (fig. 9,



fig. 9

10) In Israel the basic law, Human Dignity and Freedom, can

affect police behavior by deterring arrests and using handcuffs in major public places.

Racial-ethnic profiling, a.k.a. risk profiling (RP), often identifies potential terrorists. However, over reliance on profiling alone detracts attention from other important characteristics of terrorists. A



fig. 10

significant percent of known terrorists do not conform to the standard profile and are found outside the male 18-27 age range (Pape, 2005).⁵ Increasingly women and young boys play an important role as members of terrorist cells (fig. 11).



fig. 11

Counterculture training reverses the normative cultural expectations that women and boys are not suicide terrorists.

⁵ The problem is exacerbated when converts to the cause are enlisted who don't fit the standard racial-ethnic profile like American-born Taliban member John Walker-Lindh or Al-Qaeda "shoe-bomber" Robert Reid.

The "hide and seek" game played by male terrorists involves the use of cultural disguises. Their knowledge of the ideal terrorist profile – young male, swarthy complexion, beard and mustache – is countered by creating a different appearance and anti-stereotypical demeanor. The beard and mustache are shaved off, a modern look and style of dress is acquired to include an aroma of a popular aftershave lotion and, a readily seen alcoholic beverage in hand completes the new "non-Muslim" look.

Other disguises to conceal identity are traditional Jewish male religious garb, police and military uniforms. Common to all of the above is the use of cultural knowledge in order to deceive and gain entry to target areas undetected by passing as an Israeli.

For the attack to succeed an explosive charge must be hidden either on the HST's body or carried in an artifact. A bomb may be concealed in a belt, vest or carried in a bag or suitcase. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are transported in other ways: a book, loaf of bread, milk carton, juice container, camera, guitar case, and birdcage have all been found to conceal bombs.⁶

LEP are trained in RP to look for those well known telltale signs that signal a possible terrorist – heavy clothing in the summer, shirt, jacket, blouse covering hands, an unusual body bulge, excessive sweating, tunnel vision – "the thousand-yard stare" and, the "robotic walk." Knowing this the HSTB alters his/her profile by padding the body from neck to waist creating an anatomically true body form. Or, placing the explosive charge on the lower back or other parts of the body; places not generally paid close attention to.

⁶ IEDs are planted in cartons, discarded refrigerators, briefcases, carriages, to be detonated by remote control cell phones.

II. At the beat level: The final encounter

It is here on the street level that the final battle against terrorism takes place and is won or lost. The importance of what takes place on the street cannot be overstated. There is a strong consensus among counterterrorism experts that HST attacks will continue with a decided probability of the use of weapons of mass destruction (Karmon, 2001). A significant scientific corpus of writings, generally emanating from think tanks and academe, treats the varied aspects of terrorism – definition, motivation, policy, religion, history, trends, strategy, global organization, demographic portraits, and counterterrorism tactics. A smaller body of information, largely instructional and practical, is found in law enforcement training courses offering tactical advice and survival techniques in various high-risk, dangerous situations at the beat level. A hiatus exists between the theoretical analysis of terrorism-counterterrorism and the existential reality of the HSTB on the scene. What follows is an attempt to bring together both the theoretical-strategic models and the practical-tactical methods for combating the urban war against terrorism.

An operational model for knowing your beat⁷ and taking action is composed of people, the things they do, the time they do them, and the places they are done.

People: the target audience terrorists seek out to attack is made-up of a variety of people – retirees, pedestrians, shoppers, beggars, homeless, workers, guards, buskers, outdoor diners, peddlers, tourists, youths, and street urchins.

⁷ The beat described and analyzed here is an outdoor pedestrian street mall located in the center of a large city.

The HSTB is a member of a cell, rarely a lone operative and therefore needs several different conspirators to succeed in the assault. The Israeli experience indicates that in most cases the HST is not from the city, has little or no personal knowledge of the attack site and thus knowledgeable accomplices are necessary to direct him/her to the designated location (Horovitz, O'sullivan and Dudkevitch, 2005).⁸

The terrorist's mission begins with a need to pass through a checkpoint that requires a driver who possesses the necessary legal documents and correct vehicular license plates. The target area may have been selected earlier by a team member (spotter) who is familiar with the location, ebb and flow of citizens and other kinds of information useful for determining the best time to inflict maximum death and injury.

Disguises, Ruses, Ploys:

Counterintuitive training and cultural knowledge are necessary to uncover various terrorist disguises, ruses and ploys. The HST disguised ("stealth masking") as a typical secular Jew is revealed by clues indicating he has recently shaved off his beard or mustache. An attempt to impersonate a traditional Orthodox religious Jew can be uncovered by recognizing incorrect dress – e.g., exposed prayer shawl fringes but not wearing a skullcap (kippa); the former requires the latter. And, by asking the suspect "what are the fringes called?" (tzitzit).

A ruse is discovered by questioning the suspect about Jewish knowledge and tradition that should elicit correct answers. For example, what is the weekly Torah portion, who was the Rambam? What does the Talmud consist of? What can or can't you do on the Sabbath? What is a minyan? (a quorum of 10 men required for Orthodox

⁸ There is reason to believe of HSTBs mistakenly boarding the "wrong" bus whose route was away from the city center, the usually targeted designation.

prayer services). What is the shofar and when it is used? Or, questions about cultural, political, literary figures or sport events.

Offensive ploys by members of a terrorist cell are performed by approaching you to ask for directions, displaying an order for a hospital appointment. Or, simply taking the initiative in greeting you with an overfriendly and agreeable manner. The success of this of behavior relies on your responding in a culturally predictable way, throwing you offguard so that you don't feel the need for further contact with the person.

Place and optimum times are determined by locations of targeted crowds. Cell members assigned as spotters are knowledgeable of the customs and cultural rhythms of the population. For example, in Israel Thursday through Friday finds customers in increasing numbers in markets buying for the Sabbath. Terrorists use the Jewish calendar to learn of holidays that alter daily behavior.⁹ Purim, for example, is a holiday when many children and adults take to the streets wearing masked costumes making identification difficult.

Terrorism at the beat level cannot be fought without gathering intelligence "from the street." Information is obtained in several ways and from basically two sources: (1) those individuals known on a regular basis and (2) from questioning specific individuals. The initial request is for identification¹⁰ and is done in the form of

⁹ Historically such information was used in planning military actions – December 7th, 1941 U.S. navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was attacked on a Sunday, the Christian Sabbath. The Israeli Yom Kippur war, 1973, was started on the most holy and serious day of the Jewish year.

¹⁰ Israeli citizens at the age of sixteen are required to have an official national I.D. issued by the government.

a greeting – friendly, informational. The intention conveyed is that what is being asked for is a normal, random request for information, nothing out-of-the-ordinary.

The greeting should include verbally guiding the subject out of the mainstream of pedestrian traffic. This reduces the embarrassment potential, strengthens rapport and lessens the possibility of attracting a crowd. Unlike behavior in the United States, Israelis are drawn to an event from a crying child to a terrorist act. Not mere onlookers, they will become involved giving advice to LEP and ordering others to do what they think needs to be done.¹¹

This behavior is different from the situation in the United States where citizens are more likely to, "mind their own business" and not get involved.¹² In this information gathering procedure a number of cultural variables need to be considered. In Israel the risk of public humiliation is high. You may never successfully reach the interview stage if the subject feels publicly dishonored and turns uncooperative and confrontational. Nonverbal communicative behavior must be seen to be understood. Compare American culture where close proximity to one another and staring is considered invasive, threatening and impolite (Morris, 1978).¹³ (fig. 12).

To witness these cultural rules in action contrast American and Israeli airline security personnel interviewing passengers. Security personnel in Israel are trained to

¹¹ Americans tend to run away from an explosion, Israelis run towards it.

¹² Witness the case in New York City of "Kitty" Genovese who while being murdered in her community received no help from 38 neighbors who heard her repeated screams and did not call the police (Lardner and Reppetto, 2000). Current advice is that yelling "fire!" is more likely to bring help than a cry of "rape!"

¹³ Americans in Israel frequently remark that Israelis "stare" at them making them feel uncomfortable.

closely observe facial and body nonverbal behavior that can reveal a RP in need of further and more thorough interrogation. Whereas, U.S. airline employees will distance themselves from the subject so as not to appear to be crowding the passenger and, in order to avoid seeming impolite or hostile, eye contact is brief and alternates from interviewer to subject so as not to seem to be staring. Here culture works against close observation weakening the ability to discover important clues such as, shifty-eyed nervousness.

"Eyes" on the target: The more eyes looking, the more information acquired in your behalf. You enlist the help of those regulars who are present daily on the street to be your informants. The beggar sees everyone and is able to quickly size up the situation in ways important to you. Bus and bank guards, municipal workers, buskers, and store personnel will alert you to a suspicious object and an individual's questionable behavior. Establishing rapport is essential and is maintained by a consistent congenial friendship. Alms to the beggars and buskers keep the relationship current.



fig. 12

The power of the culture concept is its validity in the battle against terrorism. What has been demonstrated in the Israeli case can be applied elsewhere. The methodology and analysis of terrorism remains the same while cultures differ.

The need for interviewing and interrogating, for instance, is a given wherever terrorism exists. However, knowledge of the culture will determine how to conduct such a procedure. Responses to authority differ significantly in Western and non-Western societies. Compare Europe vs. Asia. "Brits" vs. Japanese.

Counterintuitive and countercultural knowledge can be an effective tactic against terrorism. In countries, e.g., where "old age" is defined "early" - - 55 and over - - training men and women as plainclothes-undercover members of a special (volunteer?) law enforcement unit to observe in airports and malls can be an important aid to LEP.¹⁴ Would you think or suspect that the "older woman" sitting in the airport, standing by the check in counter or walking the mall is wired to report a suspicious person fitting a high RP? Why wouldn't you? Think culture.

III. Implications and Action at the Beat Level

After all the theories have been discussed and all the variables analyzed, the cop-on-the-beat is alone with the ultimate decision of acting against the HSTB. Patrolling an urban beat requires a mindset, an ability to think tactically three steps ahead, and physical skills. Tactical thinking consists of the ability to take the role of the HSTB in order to anticipate his/her general behavior and specific actions. Psychological readiness is required to unhesitatingly confront the HSTB, in the reality of the moment, to shoot him/her dead or to physically attack him knowing that your action may well be fatal (Training Key #581). The zero-sum conflict is that you prevent widespread death, save many lives and reduce injuries by knowingly exposing yourself to serious injury or death.

Physical ability: a physical response that prevents or minimizes the terrorist's assault requires skillfulness in use of force and control techniques, as well as a mastery of combat handgunnery.

¹⁴ Israel has a long on-going successful experience with volunteer LEP serving in security organizations.

IV. Training Scenarios

The following scenario is designed to illustrate in some detail a sequence of events and optional responses faced by LEP on patrol at the beat level. Its purpose is to identify problems in combating urban terrorism that suggests needed areas of training (Hoffman 2003).¹⁵

Stage one: on a typical early Friday morning on a center city pedestrian mall the number of persons grows incrementally in a generally predictable manner – pedestrians passing through, workers-on-the-job, peddlers displaying their goods, a small number of shoppers, individuals pursuing business needs, a few of the 'regulars' – buskers, the homeless, beggars, and last night's holdovers from revelrous doings.

Stage two: you start your patrol with a tactical sweep systematically checking from one side of the street to the other, scanning doorways and alleys, and from rooftops to street level. During the first round you establish your presence with those "extra eyes" whom you rely on for information about people and things. At all times you remain alert to the movement of people – those who attract your attention, those fitting a RP – possible HSTB, accomplices and spotters.

Stage three: by mid-morning your beat is congested with crowds of people on the move typically numbering in the hundreds, requiring close three-hundred-and sixty degree observance and situational awareness. "Condition yellow" alert.

Stage four: a specific individual triggers "condition red", accompanied by an adrenaline surge. The suspect is moving through the area teeming with people – young,

¹⁵ Time and place may differ, however, equivalent situations exist in other locations – supermarkets, restaurants, movie houses, sport stadia, and entertainment venues.

These places share in common large crowds and are potential targets for HSTBs.

old, infants, the "regulars", pedestrians – all in a maze of movement. Your decision – your move.¹⁶

The following optional behavioral responses to a HSTB require decisions within a specific time frame, under the disadvantage that you can't know when and where the HSTB will initiate action.

Option #1: you don't do anything, due to uncertainty, concern for your own safety, and/or fearful that any action on your part will cause the HSTB to detonate.

Option #2: inconspicuously follow the suspect and call for backup.

Option #3: you approach the suspect to better determine more accurately his/her identity and condition.

Option #4: you confront the suspect in an attempt to prevent detonation of the explosive charge.

The first option is unacceptable because it does not prevent a terrorist attack. Moreover, your decision not to act indicates behavior not suited to the circumstances.

Option #2 to be inconspicuous in uniform is fraught with discovery that may cause the terrorist to act. The arrival of backup takes time that you don't want to give to the terrorist. And, the arrival of help does not always solve the problem of what action now needs to be taken by several LEP that you could not have taken by yourself.

Option #3, any contact with the suspect causes him/her to take the initiative to act.

Option #4. a confrontation most likely will provoke the HSTB to detonate the bomb (Training Key #581).

¹⁶"Condition red" can be caused by an individual who fits a high RP, or may be based on an earlier intelligence report that an HSTB has entered the city.

The express purpose of the scenario and the accompanying optional behavioral responses is to illustrate a qualitatively different problem for LEP that marks a sea change in the fight against urban warfare (Henkin, 2003)

Two significant developments have occurred in the past twenty two years.¹⁷ The terrorist's mission and ultimate goal is to kill as many innocent people as possible, regardless of age and gender, by a homicidal-suicide assault. Success is achieved by death and is applauded by community recognition, honor, monetary reward and martyrdom.¹⁸ Secondly, LEP now must combat terrorism on an uneven playing field given the HSTs advantage of determining time and place of attack. The battle is made more difficult to overcome because the situation presented here concerns a unique category of urban warfare (9/11 Commission Report) not previously addressed in the literature or dealt with in the police academy. Experts on HST don't normally walk-a-beat and the cop-on-the-beat does not have the specific training and mindset on how to prevent the terrorist homicidal-suicidal attack with or without loss of his own life (Hoffman, 2003).

To date, the response to HSTBs has been mainly ad hoc. Individuals, private guards, LEP, bus drivers, ordinary citizens, took action spontaneously with boldness and courage in confronting – face-to-face-HSTBs. In these acts of bravery many suffered death or serious injury while preventing death and injury to large numbers of

¹⁷ A distinction can be made between the advent of modern international terrorism, 1968, and suicide terrorism in 1983. My focus is on the HSTB.

¹⁸ In what has become commonplace the mother of a HSTB declared, "that she was proud of her son for what he did," to a crowd of well-wishers who are present to "congratulate" the family. Reported by Khaled Abu Toameh. Jerusalem Post, Oct. 28, 2005.

the terrorist's intended victims. These acts represent clear examples of behavior akin to other such deeds by members of the armed forces, LEP, first responders, who unselfishly and without personal concern for their own safety acted to help and save others.

To reiterate, members of the armed services who sacrifice their lives for others by throwing themselves on a hand grenade, attempts to save a drowning person, firefighters who, against orders, reenter a burning collapsing building to rescue, first responders, and "Good Samaritans" of all kinds, are examples of people who perform involuntary acts of courage. In other words, these acts are not premeditated. The individuals who carry out these actions do so to save lives while wanting to survive the effort. LEP train to seek cover, shoot faster, more accurately; firefighters wear equipment to prevent injury and death, first responders apply their training in performing dangerous duties. However, what is especially noteworthy is that in all of these examples there is no intention to die.¹⁹

What is missing in the discussion of counterterrorism is the deliberate expressed acknowledgement that defeating the HSTB on the street mandates training for an act that requires self-sacrifice in the knowledge that the outcome can be your own death. How to train for a planned intentional act of self-sacrifice in what has been called a "new age of terror" is what follows.

V. Train as you engage – Engage as you trained
Counterterrorism on an urban beat

¹⁹ A notable exception are U.S. Secret Service agents who are trained, "to take a bullet" for the President, vice president and designated others.

The proposed training program stresses the use of the culture concept, counter-intuitive – counterculture, street smart surveillance, threat assessment, and tactical reactions to HSTB.

Training methods are designed for interactive training scenarios formatted for hands on problem solving under stress in real time. Role playing, simulation exercises, computer animated engagement, scenario assignments, address topics and problems such as, risk profiling (RP), the force continuum, judgmental-decision making, identifying and revealing disguises, ruses and ploys. Special attention is given to developing the necessary psychological mindset for executing lethal self- sacrifices.

Brief examples of the training program are presented for illustrative purposes. Projection of normal scenes in restaurants, malls, discotheques, the streets and in office buildings.

1. Task: identify and assign level of response (amber, orange, red) to suspicious individual(s) (HSTB, spotter, accomplices) and explain your decision.

2. Role play: one staff player + trainee (or 2) approaching an individual in a subway station. Staff member's responses are both spontaneous and planned. A train is due to arrive in 3 minutes.

3. Scenario: compose a scenario of HSTB in your city, on your beat. What is the most likely disguise? What would you not likely be looking for?

4. Simulation: exercise A: two person teams (partners) at designated location – central train station, stadium, street, movie theater, restaurant. Staff member points out individuals for you to identify as HSTB, spotter, accomplice.

Exercise B: same situation where individual is potential HSTB. You are to react in a timed exercise.

5. Taking the role of the other: given a map of a specific area in the city, plan entrance – exit routes, detonation location and explain your reasoning.

6. Photograph exam/evaluation: identify and explain least potential HSTB, spotter, accomplice.

7. Group discussion and analysis:

a. Being part of your culture is an advantage. Give examples describing typical cultural behavior. Give examples of behavior clearly different from your culture.

b. In situations where HSTs do not fit any clear RP what do you look for in seeking out possible terrorists?

c. Where "probable cause" is the law how do you react to a RP person?

8. List and explain clues, behavior that alert you to conditions amber, orange, red. For example, you and your partner arrive at the scene after an HSB attack.

Describe and explain your immediate reaction.

9. Role play: checking persons and objects. The content of a backpack, briefcase, attaché case, suitcase, shopping bag, or container, need to be inspected. Do you,

a. visually inspect?

b. ask the carrier to expose what is contained inside?

c. personally examine the object?

Levels of response at the beat level: a tactical typology

A correlation exists between an alertness scale and the force of your response.

Neutral: Unawareness of beat environment, people, places, things.

Amber: RP profile is condition amber. Alert to suspicious individual appearing nervous, uncertainty of whereabouts. No discernable body bulges, backpack looks normal. Age range and gender fits profile. Hands clearly observable.

Orange: Age and gender fits RP. Left hand not clearly observable. Inappropriate clothing. Uncertainty, nervous, sweating. Possible irregular body shape. Walking toward bus stop.

Red: Surety at significant level, 95%. Age range fits. Gender male. Conspicuously heavy backpack. Hands concealed – left hand in pocket, right hand covered by extra long jacket sleeve, nervous – sweating demeanor – "100 yard stare". Walking motion sporadically reveals what appears to be wires in right hand. Subject approaching restaurant at noon time.

The purpose of this typology is twofold: 1. it presents a paradigm for practical use by LEP on patrol at the beat level; and, 2. it can function as a training device. Normally two officers patrol a beat and must cooperate in decision making and taking action (Albrecht and Morrison, 1992). A trainee exercise requires reactions to each category of the model. E.g., questions are asked such as, under condition amber what additional information is needed in order to take action? With only the information given, what action should be taken? The same questions are applied to the other categories.

An additional component of the exercise requires two LEP partners to role-play acting out what is to be done for each category. Here, for example, two person partners are given a brief amount of time (5 to 10 minutes) to study the categories and decide how to respond to each condition. In a simulated situation they are required to role-play their responses with staff members acting as the subject described in each condition. Each case is timed thus interjecting the need for a quick decision under duress. Staff

and participants evaluate, offer suggestions, and replay the simulated action under different conditions of alert.

VI. Developing a Mindset

Psychological training to develop a mindset for lethal self-sacrifice presents a problem, *sue generis*, in combating the HSTB. Perhaps the clearest way to demonstrate self-sacrifice, as a tactic, is to present the hypothetical case of a confirmed HSTB approaching a crowded venue—mall, restaurant, bus stop. While several options may appear available, in reality I will show, that in fact, only one response is possible that will minimize death and injury.

In almost all cases the HSTB is rigged with a handheld explosive detonator (fig. 13). This puts the terrorist in total control of his explosive. We know that the bomber is set to "go off," that he is ambulatory and able to choose when and where to launch his attack; free of constraints in the knowledge that for him success is his final homicide-suicide act. Given the correctness of this description, he is the "ultimate smart bomb," (Hoffman, 2003). The problem of how to minimize the effects of the HSTB's assault is seemingly without a satisfactory solution for the following reasons. The HSTB sees LEP approaching and he detonates, if they attempt to physically confront him, he detonates. Shooting will detonate him and attempting a headshot while moving on a moving target is likely to fail. However, even when a headshot is successful the HSTB can have up to 20 seconds of life left with which to detonate.²⁰ Fully comprehending the situation as described makes evident the need for



fig. 13

²⁰ A more technical discussion includes aim points, immediate incapacitation, and instant brain death. However, a number of other problems exist such as, hesitancy to

a self-sacrificial response to an HSTB as the only valid tactic. To achieve proficiency in this tactic requires rigorous training, psychological and physical, so that the response becomes automatic. The sacrificial tactic is a maneuver that I have termed, a "wrap-around-bear-hug" (WABH). The function of the WABH is to tightly embrace (wrap one's arms around frontal, back or lateral position) the HSTB causing the bomb to implode within the confines of the two bodies now sandwiched together and thus reducing the amount of damage to people in the immediate surrounding area.²¹ This maneuver can be diagramed as a linear model within a specific time frame. (1) an observational identity is made, (2) an evaluation using the RP on the alertness scale is determined "red", (3) judgmental decision to act, (4) an attack is launched against HSTB with a WABH, tightly encircling the LEP and HSTB. Detonation occurs. The tactic is deliberate, psychologically premeditated and the result of training.

A caveat is in order concerning acts of self-sacrifice. Requiring LEP to knowingly undertake and train for an act of self-sacrifice is inimical to moral values of self-preservation extant in Western culture. It is difficult in the extreme to postulate an American government approving and ordering a Japanese style Kamikaze suicide attack as a morally acceptable tactic.

shoot, weak resolve, distant shooting in crowded areas, and legal liabilities

(Spaulding, 2005).

²¹ Examples of this kind of encounters against the bomber exist. However, it is important to note that the responses were unplanned, not trained for, and perhaps a reflexive action similar to how one would react to witnessing a criminal act.

In the case of the HSTB what LEP are asked to carry out is an altruistic act that is life' saving. This frame of mind is essential in developing a psychological mindset that permits and supports altruistic behavior.

The physical aspect is linked in combination to the psychological mindset. In an actual situation partners will have trained who is and how to unhesitatingly and quickly take action. The attack is launched in a very short time frame necessitating charging the HSTB. Training is pivotal for both the proper psychological mindset and physical encounter. Altruistic lethal self-sacrifice is a tactic requiring a singular act of disciplined behavior. It is the answer to the problem of the HSTB.

Additionally, there remains the problem of how to react to probable HSTBs whose status, while matching a risk profile (RP), cannot be determined with the same amount of certainty that exists under condition "red alert." Several techniques, however, can be applied when RPs are amber or orange. In both cases, "the hands" of the suspect are paramount in determining reactions by LEP. Except for a clear sight of a detonator in hand, the HSTB must be taken down and immobilized by use of power moves. A detonator frequently is concealed in pockets of clothing or attached to a backpack strap. When the HSTB is high on drugs and the adrenaline is in full flow you only will have seconds to take down and prevent the detonation. You, therefore, must decide on a take down technique along with an alternate method. For example, break his wrist, fingers, arm, gouge out his eyes, blow to his groin, and "fish hook" check punch.

Another technique utilizes the uniform presence of LEP to affect the behavior of a suspected HSTB. Shunting is a learned skill for diverting a suspected HSTB away from crowds of people and toward less congested areas where he then can be confronted. This ability to control a suspect's behavior is possible when the suspect

believes that he has not been seen and isn't being watched by LEP. He then will move in directions away from the LEP, unaware that he is now being shunted to a specific area.

The material presented is an attempt to demonstrate how the culture concept is an important and useful analytical tool for predicting behavior. The case for a rigorous training program is stressed. The emphasis throughout is on the need to learn tactical skills for engaging terrorism in an urban setting. The unique problem of the HSTB requires special attention to the bombers committed course of action that ends in his homicide-suicide assault. The HSTB is free of fear of failure. Failure for him is remaining alive, unable to complete his mission with detonation. Once in place in a crowd the HSTB's mission is unstoppable.²² Success for the HSTB derives from a death-wish -- his and others. Countering his death-wish is made difficult because he is rigged in such a way that preventing detonation becomes nearly impossible. I have argued for a technique (WABH) that requires an altruistic act of self-sacrifice that saves lives, reduces injuries and that can be lethal to LEP. For LEP to carry out acts of self-sacrifice a psychological mindset is needed for what may be considered a cultural abnormal act. This method is based on an understanding and acceptance by LEP that success of this altruistic self-sacrifice is now an integral part of his duty in the singular fight against HST warfare.

²² Quoted by police operations officer, Jerusalem Post, October 28, 2005.

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Acknowledgement:

Every "rookie" needs the seasoned veteran to teach him needed survival "street smarts." I owe a debt of gratitude to Seymour "Pinch" Pine, Deputy Inspector ret. NYCPD.

To gain insights into big city policing my thanks to Sgt. L. Smulevitz, CPD.

Police everywhere define their partners as someone "I can depend on." My current beat partner, Yehuda Tolchinsky, "covers my back" and is my intellectual sounding board. My wife, Dr. Esther Schely-Newman, is the keen eye and analytical reader whose final evaluation sets everything right. I remain more than grateful for her support and effort.

Footnotes

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1. To strategically define this form of terrorism it is important to understand the terrorist's modus operandi. The method of assault is designed to cause widespread death (homicide) and injuries to the largest number of civilians regardless of age and gender.
 2. It has been suggested that the handshake in Western cultures functions to maintain a proper distance between two individuals. Perhaps, a more practical explanation is that the extended open hand can be seen as weapon free. In the Middle East greetings often are with an embrace.

3. Middle East inhabitants have been termed "contact people" versus Western culture "non-contact" people (Montague, 1971).
4. "Car thief stabs two cops. ..." (Jerusalem Post, Oct. 24, 2005). "... Border policeman ... when the suspect ... pulled a knife from his shoe and charged him and stabbed him." (Jerusalem Post, Feb. 7, 2003).
5. The problem is exacerbated when converts to the cause are enlisted who don't fit the standard racial-ethnic profile like American-born Taliban member John Walker-Lindh or Al-Qaeda "shoe-bomber" Robert Reid. Upper and middle class professionals serve as spotters and accomplices.
6. IEDs are planted in cartons, discarded refrigerators, briefcases, carriages, to be detonated by remote control cell phones.
7. The beat described and analyzed here is an outdoor pedestrian street mall located in the center of a large city.
8. There is reason to believe of HSTBs mistakenly boarding the "wrong" bus whose route was away from the city center, the usually targeted designation.
9. Historically such information was used in planning military actions – December 7th, 1941 U.S. navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was attacked on a Sunday, the Christian Sabbath. The Israeli Yom Kippur war, 1973, was started on the most holy and serious day of the Jewish year.
10. Israeli citizens at the age of sixteen are required to have an official national I.D. issued by the government.
11. Americans tend to run away from an explosion, Israelis run towards it.
12. Witness the case in New York City of "Kitty" Genovese who while being murdered in her community received no help from 38 neighbors who heard her repeated screams and did not call the police (Lardner and Reppetto, 2000).

Current advice is that yelling "fire!" is more likely to bring help than a cry of "rape!"

13. Americans in Israel frequently remark that Israelis "stare" at them making them feel uncomfortable.
14. Israel has a long on-going successful experience with volunteer LEP serving in security organizations.
15. Time and place may differ, however, equivalent situations exist in other locations – supermarkets, restaurants, movie houses, sport stadia, and entertainment venues. These places share in common large crowds and are potential targets for HSTBs.
16. "Condition red" can be caused by an individual who fits a high RP, or may be based on an earlier intelligence report that an HSTB has entered the city.
17. A distinction can be made between the advent of modern international terrorism, 1968, and suicide terrorism in 1983. My focus is on the HSTB.
18. In what has become commonplace the mother of a HSTB declared, "that she was proud of her son for what he did," to a crowd of well-wishers who are present to "congratulate" the family. Reported by Khaled Abu Toameh. Jerusalem Post, Oct. 28, 2005.
19. A notable exception are U.S. Secret Service agents who are trained, "to take a bullet" for the President, vice president and designated others.
20. A more technical discussion includes aim points, immediate incapacitation, and instant brain death. However, a number of other problems exist such as, hesitancy to shoot, weak resolve, distant shooting in crowded areas, and legal liabilities (Spaulding, 2005).

21. Examples of this kind of encounters against the bomber exist. However, it is important to note that the responses were unplanned, not trained for, and perhaps a reflexive action similar to how one would react to witnessing a criminal act (Bana and Harel 2002; Lefkovits 2002).
 22. Quoted by police operations officer, Jerusalem Post, October 28, 2005.
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